Comparisons featuring these companies.
The ideas behind these case studies, answered straight.
Frequently asked
(5)Why did so much EdTech collapse after the pandemic boom?
Lockdowns created a one-time demand spike that companies mistook for permanent behavior change, and they raised and spent against that assumption. When classrooms reopened, demand reverted but the cost base — sales teams, acquisition spend, acquisitions — didn't. The collapse wasn't a demand problem so much as a unit-economics problem: companies that paid more to acquire a student than they ever earned back, papered over by growth, were exposed the moment growth stalled.
What did Byju's get wrong that Physics Wallah got right?
Byju's scaled acquisition and M&A faster than it proved payback, treating growth as the goal rather than a result of profitable units. Physics Wallah did the opposite — low price, high volume, tight costs, profitability before scale — which is why it reached large scale without the capital overhang. The lesson isn't 'India is cheap'; it's that in a price-sensitive market, the durable model is built on margin discipline, not funded losses.
Why is retention the hardest problem in EdTech?
Because the product's job is to make itself unnecessary: a student who succeeds graduates and leaves, and a student who struggles churns. Education also fights motivation decay — the gap between intending to learn and actually showing up. Duolingo's answer was to treat retention as a game-design problem (streaks, reminders, habit loops) rather than a content problem, which is why it kept daily engagement most EdTech never came close to.
What business models actually work in EdTech?
The durable ones avoid the trap of selling a one-time outcome to a one-time buyer. Freemium-plus-credential (Coursera) monetizes the certificate while content stays free. B2B tooling (Classplus) sells software to educators instead of courses to students, which is a recurring, higher-margin relationship. Habit-based consumer apps (Duolingo) monetize engagement over years. All three replace 'sell a course, hope they come back' with a structural reason to keep paying.
Is EdTech a bad category, or were the business models bad?
The category is real — people will always pay to learn and credential — but it punishes growth-at-all-costs harder than most because outcomes are slow, trust is fragile, and buyers are price-sensitive. The failures weren't proof that EdTech can't work; they were proof that EdTech can't be brute-forced with marketing spend. The survivors share margin discipline and a recurring reason to stay, not a bigger ad budget.